Showing posts with label technology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label technology. Show all posts
Tuesday, 16 July 2013
Prism Planet
Anyone to which this flap over Prism is a surprise is, frankly, naive and ill-informed. The only news to me was being introduced to this new name.
Five Eyes SIGINT or ECHELON has been known to exist for decades and was the feature of a European Parliament report back in 2001 where the threat of industrial espionage is understood as paramount. It is clear that every action on every phone and web based system, across the world, is possible to have been subject to intercept and likely subject of analysis.
See: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2001-0264+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN
The technical possibilities remain unknown but it is evident that these systems employ super-computers of gigantic capacity capable of robotic artificial-intelligence analysis of all interactions and associations, including geographic, to seek-out correlations of interest and so identify subjects for closer observation and deeper analysis.
It is also clear these automated systems have the same ability to examine actual communications content, including spoken, on a wide and random scale to further identify and analyse targets of interest.
Whilst it is comforting to think this is only done to protect society from extraordinary threats it is evident even from the synopsis of the EU report, sighted above, that this system is prospectively used for a far wider mode of operation than that: ranging from industrial espionage to the political subjugation of other sovereign states.
But rather than the EU acting to curtail these activities the closing remarks of their 2001 report demonstrates no less than a jealousy and a desire to form the same system or to even integrate and share.
See P192 - 12. The EU's external relations and intelligence gathering
So I would ask the question (but do not anticipate an answer): How deeply involved is the EU with Prism and indeed does it benefit from the intelligence derived, especially in relation to the EU member state's sovereign governments?
Whilst for the US to risk allowing the intelligence services of each and every EU member state to draw from the intelligence and analysis they derive from their vast network is improbable it is more likely a focused EU intelligence service would be considered a less risky partner to develop.
Once all the tools desirable to a draconian and authoritarian state have been put into place all that remains is for that state to arise, to become evident, when resistance will have be made all-but imposable.
Monday, 30 April 2012
My view on YouView
"YouView will be everything you've ever wanted from TV in one easy-to-use
box: Freeview, catch-up TV, High Definition and a personal video
recorder (to pause, rewind and record live TV). It means the programmes
you love will be ready to watch whenever you want. Simple."
Telegraph:
I am confused. How technically difficult is the YouView objective to achieve? Not so very me thinks.
I think there is a sub-plot behind the endless delays that is more about not being accused of launching a platform that is so easy, agreeable to the public and focal of free content that it all but corners and stifles the market. Pay to view and cable content providers can see the monster on the horizon. A platform that works, that is stuffed with free content and potentially provides an open pathway to each and every independent provider will kill 9/10th of their lucrative captive market.
YouView is the BBC: disguised in the outfits of its slowly dying terrestrial broadcast mates. Sky begrudgingly appeared at the table late on and apparently declined to join-up, but until the News International Murdoch 'phone hacking' debacle reaches its termination and the wooden stake is finally hammered home, they will not risk a launch; for fear it will all end-up in court where the international media power players may well then rule the day.
Between times they will stall even at the apparent cost of market share: if only because by allowing the market to commence and develop they cannot stand accused of monopolising and stifling it from the outset.
Perhaps the show will get smartly onto the road when it is clear the last nail has been hammered home to the door of theMaxwell Black Murdoch family mausoleum.
Telegraph:
Lord Sugar blow over YouView delay
It was supposed to revolutionise the way we watch television, blazing onto our screens in 2010 and doing for every broadcaster what the iPlayer has done for the BBC.
I am confused. How technically difficult is the YouView objective to achieve? Not so very me thinks.
I think there is a sub-plot behind the endless delays that is more about not being accused of launching a platform that is so easy, agreeable to the public and focal of free content that it all but corners and stifles the market. Pay to view and cable content providers can see the monster on the horizon. A platform that works, that is stuffed with free content and potentially provides an open pathway to each and every independent provider will kill 9/10th of their lucrative captive market.
YouView is the BBC: disguised in the outfits of its slowly dying terrestrial broadcast mates. Sky begrudgingly appeared at the table late on and apparently declined to join-up, but until the News International Murdoch 'phone hacking' debacle reaches its termination and the wooden stake is finally hammered home, they will not risk a launch; for fear it will all end-up in court where the international media power players may well then rule the day.
Between times they will stall even at the apparent cost of market share: if only because by allowing the market to commence and develop they cannot stand accused of monopolising and stifling it from the outset.
Perhaps the show will get smartly onto the road when it is clear the last nail has been hammered home to the door of the
Tuesday, 28 February 2012
Friday, 8 July 2011
More to Phone-hacking than Accessing Voice-mail with Passwords
There is far more to this phone hacking caper than simply accessing voice-mail with passwords.
Cell phones can be activated remotely, loaded with software that takes control of the phone, records text messages, records calls, uses the inbuilt microphones as a listening device/bug, takes all GPS location data, address-book data, call logs, web-history, everything - current and historic - and transmits all, as and when required, to the hijacker when it can then also receive new instructions.
The cellular network transmitter/station local to a target phone can be replaced with a decoy transmitter that relays the signal on to the real network. The phone must give the transmitter a code to prove who it is to the network but the network does not have to give the phone any code to prove it is the real network. The phone can be told to transmit without encryption and the false cell transmitter can gain control of the phone in such a way, to download hijack software to take permanent covert control of the phone.
A 'virus' can be sent to the phone to similarly take control of it or the phone can be infected if it is in the possession of the hacker for a very short time. It is possible to hack a phone via it's wireless connection, blue-tooth or even via a text message.
This may be the reason why the 'authorities' do not want phone intercept intelligence used as evidence in court; because they do not want to plainly admit what can be done and what is being done. Perhaps this is why the police have been reluctant to further investigations into this matter or perhaps there is another layer between the journalists, the cash, the police and who is doing the actual covert spying on mobile phones.
LINKS
Cell phones can be activated remotely, loaded with software that takes control of the phone, records text messages, records calls, uses the inbuilt microphones as a listening device/bug, takes all GPS location data, address-book data, call logs, web-history, everything - current and historic - and transmits all, as and when required, to the hijacker when it can then also receive new instructions.
The cellular network transmitter/station local to a target phone can be replaced with a decoy transmitter that relays the signal on to the real network. The phone must give the transmitter a code to prove who it is to the network but the network does not have to give the phone any code to prove it is the real network. The phone can be told to transmit without encryption and the false cell transmitter can gain control of the phone in such a way, to download hijack software to take permanent covert control of the phone.
A 'virus' can be sent to the phone to similarly take control of it or the phone can be infected if it is in the possession of the hacker for a very short time. It is possible to hack a phone via it's wireless connection, blue-tooth or even via a text message.
This may be the reason why the 'authorities' do not want phone intercept intelligence used as evidence in court; because they do not want to plainly admit what can be done and what is being done. Perhaps this is why the police have been reluctant to further investigations into this matter or perhaps there is another layer between the journalists, the cash, the police and who is doing the actual covert spying on mobile phones.
LINKS
'Pinging': how phone hacking targets were located with help from the police NEW!
Phone hacking: Met police to investigate mobile tracking claims NEW!
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Just one of these fat worms is hinted at with a story in The Sunday Times: ‘Apps spy on phone messages’ (which you cannot access without a subscription).
But the gist of it below is at this link : http://www.theweek.co.uk/daily-briefing/45566/ten-things-you-need-know-today-sunday-26-feb-2012
3. PHONE APPS SPY ON MESSAGES
Companies, including Facebook, are using smartphone apps to spy on users’ phone messages and gather information about their lives. A Sunday Times investigation also found that some apps can access users’ internet history which is transmitted to third party advertisers, while other apps can remotely control a phone’s camera.
My reading of the publication of this item is to set the ground for if and when it comes out that Screws Indigestible has been doing a lot more than just hacking mobile answer-phones or even computer e-mail. It is to say ‘look folks; everybody’s doing this stuff, its not really so bad and scary. It's the new normal’.
See here an idea of what else is possible when actually 'hacking' mobiles: http://eubrainwashing.blogspot.com/2011/07/more-to-phone-hacking-than-accessing.html
But the effect of such revelation still has the potential to be devastating for NI and the Mudoiks.
The can chock full of juicy worms could well go deeper still. That would be who helped, who allowed powers reserved for the highest levels of police investigation and state security to be usurped for ‘third-party’ surveillance. Surveillance not only of a meaningless celebrity’s toilet habits but such that could compromise national security and those in positions of real power and authority. And yet deeper; is it only the news rooms of NI that benefited from such knowledge and leverage that may have resulted or could this spying network have a darker beneficiary than just pennies on a news-stand.
Trust that such would not occur, just because it should not occur, is misplaced.